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INTERNATIONAL ILLEGALITY AS A BASIS FOR REFUSAL
TO PARTICIPATE IN HOSTILITIES-A TENTATIVE
PROPOSAL AND A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF
AMERICAN LAW
DAVID M. COHEN*
INTRODUCTION
"In the years preceding the Second World War the policies of the
Western powers were animated ... by the desire to avoid war at any
price." I Thus, upon the termination of hostilities in the First World
War, the various nations of the world, under the leadership of President
Wilson, set out to establish an international organization which would
be charged with the responsibility of preserving the peace. The League
of Nations, the organization which resulted, was founded upon the
recognition of "international law as the actual rule of conduct among
governments." 2 The members were obligated "to respect and preserve
as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing inde-
pendence of all members of the League," 3 and a procedure was estab-
lished pursuant to which the League was to ensure that any change in
the status quo was effected by peaceful means.4
Those who desired international peace did not rest with the estab-
lishment of the League however.
On August 27, 1928, as the result of a campaign to "outlaw" war,5
fifteen nations (soon to be joined by virtually all remaining nations)
signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact6 pursuant to which the parties agreed
"to renounce war as an instrument of national policy in their relations
with one another." 7 The fundamental policy embodied in the Kellogg-
Briand Pact was articulated by the tribunal in the "High Command
Trial":
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law.
1. MORGENTHAU, POLITmcs AMONG NATONS 241 (3rd ed. 1963).
2. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT preamble.
3. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 10.
4. See generally MORGENTHAU, supra note 1, at 298-301.
5. See BAILEY, A DIPLOmATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERIcAN PEOPLE 649-50 (7th ed.
1964).
6. 46 Stat. 2343.
7. Id. at 2345-6.
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[T] he nations that entered into the Kellogg-Briand Pact considered
it imperative that existing international relationships should not be
changed by force. In the preamble they state that they are "per-
suaded that the time has come when. -. all changes in their rela-
tionships with one another should be sought only by pacific means."
This is a declaration that from that time forward each of the sig-
natory nations should be deemed to possess and to have the right
to exercise all the privileges and powers of a sovereign nation
within the limitations of International Law, free from all inter-
ferences by force on the part of any nation. As a corollary to
this, the changing or attempting to change the international rela-.
tionships.by force of arms is an act of aggression and if aggression
results in war, the war is an aggressive war.8
Despite these efforts, war again engulfed the nations of the world.
At the conclusion of the Second World War, another effort was made
to establish an international organization charged with the responsi-
bility for saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war." 9
Each member of the new organization, the United Nations, pledged
to "settle . .. [its] international disputes by peaceful means" '0 and to
"refrain in . . . [its] international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state." 11 Again a procedure was established pursuant to which the
members, acting through the organization, would prevent international
disputes -from endangering the maintenance of international peace and
security.12
Although only future historians will be in a position to render a final
judgment, it does appear that the United Nations has not been as ef-
fective as the founders had hoped. The reasons for this failure may
be complex but at least the major factors can be noted:
The constitutional scheme of the United Nations was built upon
three political assumptions. First, the great powers, acting in unison,
would deal with any threat to peace and security, regardless of its
source. Second, their combined wisdom and strength would be
sufficient to meet all such threats without resort to war. Third, no
8. High Command Trial, 12 LAW RFPoRTs OF TmALs OF WAR CRIMINALS 1, 70 (1949).
9. U. N. CHARtER preamble.
10. U. N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 3.
11. U. N. CHmR art. 2, para. 4.
12. See generally U. N. CHARTE arts. 33-51.
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such- threat would emanate from one of the great powers them-
selves. These assumptions have not withstood the test of experi-
ence. The great powers have not been able to act in unison when
their divergent interests were at stake, which is another way of
saying that they have been able to act in unison only in rare and
exceptional circumstances. And the main threat to the peace and
security of the world emanates from the great powers themselves.
Thus the constitutional scheme of the Charter has been defied by
the political reality of the postwar world.13
Although in practical terms the efforts noted above may, in some
sense, be considered failures, they cannot be said to have been wholly
without effect. At least one commentator has noted that "the knowl-
edge is common today that after long centuries of development cul-
minating in the . . . formulations of the League of Nations, the- Pact
of Paris, the United Nations Charter and the Nuremberg Charter, Ver-
dict, and Principles, the general community of states has achieved a
distinction between permissible and nonpermissible coercion, with that
coercion prohibited which creates in a target state reasonable expecta-
tion that it will be forced to use the military instrument in defense of
its independence and territorial integrity." 14
However, as long as the competence of international tribunals 'de-
pends upon the consent of the states involved in the dispute and as
long as the United Nations remains unable to act in certain circum-
stances to maintain peace, "the special prerogative claimed by states
to interpret their own cause," 15 long regarded "as a conspicuous
Achilles heel in international law," 16 will, to a great extent, nullify the
fact that international law prohibits certain forms of coercion; any state
which decides to engage in hostilities will no doubt contend that its
action is consistent with the norms of international law.
Although such an "auto-interpretation" 17 of the norms of interna-
tional law has been held to be ultimately subject to investigation and
adjudication by an international tribunal,'8 international judicial review
13. MORGENTHAU, supra note 1 at 484-5.
14. McDOUGAL, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Party
-Oriented Perspective, in STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 157, 183 (1960).
15. Id.'at 188.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. For example, the Nuremberg Tribunal stated:
[I]t was further argued that Germany alone could decide, in accordance
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of a decision to engage in hostilitie has been, up to the present, essen-
tially ad hoc. Thus, even assuming that discoverable norms of inter-
national law regarding the permissible utilization of coercion do exist
in fact, if these norms are ever to become more than devices which
can be utilized to rationalize implementation of policy decisions made
with little or no regard to the norms or simply tools for ad hoc con-
demnation and punishment, a more effective means of applying the
norms in a manner which will limit policy choices in the first instance
must be located.
The absence of an effective centralized international judicial institu-
tion as a means for the application of international prescription has
seriously impaired the role of international law as a limitation upon
the range of policy choices available to national actors. One method
of remedying this defect has been to "internalize" the norms of inter-
national law by means of a specific constitutional provision. 19 For ex-
ample, the French constitution provides that "treaties or agreements
duly ratified or approved shall, upon their publication, have an author-
ity superior to that of laws, subject, for each agreement or treaty, to
its application by the other party," 20 and the Basic Law of the Federal
Republic of Germany provides that "the general rules of public inter-
national law form part of the Federal law [;] they take precedence over
the laws and directly create rights for the inhabitants of the Federal
territory." 21 In all of these countries, at least some norms of interna-
tional law exert the same moral force upon national policy-makers
as does the national constitution. But more importantly, in those coun-
tries in which the judiciary possesses the power of review of legislative
and executive acts, the constitutional provisions have the effect of
utilizing domestic courts as institutions for the application of inter-
national prescriptions, i.e., the actions of national decision-makers may
with the reservations made by many of the Signatory Powers, at the time
of the conclusion of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, whether a preventative ac-
tion was a necessity, and in making her decision, her judgment was conclu-
sive. But whether action taken under the claim of self-defense was in fact
aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to investigation and
adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced.
Id. at 189-90.
19. id. at 213-4.
20. Article 55 of the French Constitution of 1958 is reprinted in SrIN and HAY,
LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE ATLANTIc AREA 29 (1967).
21. Article 25 of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany is reprinted
in id. at 72.
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be nullified by the judiciary when held to be in conflict with the norms
of international law.
It is submitted that in those countries which do not possess constitu-
tional provisions similar to those possessed by France and the Federal
Republic of Germany but which do permit judicial nullification of
legislative and political acts, independent domestic judicial review, in-
cluding the application of the norms of international law, may serve
as a means of effectuating the international prescription prohibiting the
resort to certain forms of coercion. Given the existence of an inter-
national norm prohibiting the resort to military force in some circum-
stances, one method of increasing effective application of this norm
would be to permit individual citizens to resist participation, via judi-
cial proceedings in a domestic court, in the nation's armed forces upon
the basis that the forces were to be employed in hostilities prohibited
by international law. If the domestic courts retained sufficient inde-
pendence from the influence of other governmental institutions and did,
in fact, hold that the hostilities were prohibited by international law,
presumably the ability of the nation's policy-makers to engage in the
hostilities would be seriously limited (provided, of course, that a num-
ber of citizens sufficient to successfully engage in the hostilities did not
do so voluntarily, i.e., despite the fact that they possessed a right to
refuse participation).
This proposal would appear to offer a possibility of effectively ad-
vancing the pursuit of peace and, if it were to prove ineffective in fact,
it would not appear to adversely affect the current situation. If the
domestic courts operated independently of other national decision-
makers, the international community would gain the advantage of
increasing effective application of international prescriptions. If, how-
ever, the domestic courts did not act independently and in effect ac-
quiesced in the decision of the other domestic policy-makers despite the
invalidity of the hostilities under international law, and/or the decisions
of the national courts misapplied the prescriptions of international law,
the decisions of the courts would have no effect upon the international
validity of the hostilities and could not be utilized as a defense to
an international prosecution of the policy-makers for the commission
of crimes against peace.2 2 At least, therefore, an initial investigation
of the proposal would appear warranted.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to-:an analysis of American
22. See McDoJm, supra note 14 at 198-205.
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law in light of the following questions: Does a procedure exist where-
by an American citizen may resist induction into the armed forces
of the United States upon the basis that the forces are to be employed
in hostilities prohibited by international law? Does a procedure exist
whereby a member of the armed forces may resist an order of his
superior officer upon a similar basis? Assuming a procedure does exist,
what principles of domestic law, if any, limit the jurisdiction of the
domestic courts? Assuming the domestic courts possess jurisdiction,
what principles of domestic law, if any, will cause the courts to de-
cline to decide the issue upon the merits? Assuming the courts will
undertake to render a decision upon the merits, what principles of
domestic law, if any, will affect the probability of a decision favorable
to the citizen?
PROCEDURE, JURISDICTION, AND JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT
Present United States law2 3 provides for an exemption from com-
batant service for those individuals who, by reason of religious train-
ing and belief are conscientiously opposed to war in any form24 and
does not permit an individual to resist induction into military service
on the basis that he is being inducted in order to participate in an
unlawful war. Even if an individual were permitted to resist induction
upon the basis that the war in which he was being compelled to par-
ticipate was illegal, the procedure pursuant to which he would seek
judicial confirmation of his contention is inadequate.
Every American male citizen upon attaining the age of eighteen is
required to register under the Military Selective Service Act of 1967.25
Upon registration, the relevant local board classifies the registrant in
one of the categories established by the Act and the relevant regulations
and notifies the registrant of this classification. If the registrant objects
to the classification, i.e., if he feels he should have been classified in a
23. The Military Selective Service Act of 1967 (hereinafter referred to as 1967 Act)
is composed of provisions contained in 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 451 et seq. (1964) and the
amendments to some of those provisions contained in Public Law 90-40 (90th Cong.,
1st Sess.) reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1342 (1967) (hereinafter referred
to as 1967 Amendments).
The relevant regulations are contained in 32 C.F.R. § 1600 et seq. and in the amend-
ments to some of those regulations contained in Exec. Order No. 11360, 32 FE. REG.
9787 (1967).
24. 1967 Amendments para. 7, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 1347 (1967).
25. 1967 Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. S 453 (1964). The Act also applies to aliens under
specified circumstances. See 50 US.C.A. App. S 454 (1964).
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different category, he may request a personal appearance before his
local board.20 After this personal appearance, the local board considers
the registrant's contentions and notifies the registrant of its determina-
tion by sending him another notice of classification.
If the registrant continues to object to the local board's classification,
he may appeal to the relevant appeal board.28 The appeal board, before
which the registrant is not permitted to appear, 9 will consider the
registrant's file de novo. The registrant will be notified of the appeal
board's decision when he receives a notice of classification from the
local board.3° If the decision of the appeal board was not unanimous
and if the registrant disputes the decision of the appeal board, the
registrant may appeal to the Presidential appeal board.3' If the decision
of the appeal board was unanimous and if the registrant disputes the
decision of the appeal board, the registrant may attempt to obtain the
intervention of the State Director of Selective Service or the Director
of Selective Service, who may intervene by requesting the appeal board
to reconsider its decision3 2 or by forwarding the registrant's case to
the Presidential appeal board33 when intervention is deemed to be in
the national interest or necessary to avoid injustice.
The participation of the judiciary in this process is extremely lim-
ited.84 Unless the initial classification exerts a "chilling effect" upon
26. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(a) (1967). The registrant is not permitted to be represented
by counsel and is not entitled as a matter of right to present witnesses in his behalf.
32 C.F.R. § 1624.1(b) (1967).
27. 32 C.F.R. § 1624.2(d) (1967).
28. 32 C.F.R. S 1626.2 (1967). The appeal is initiated when the registrant files a
written notice of appeal with the local board. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.11 (1967). It is the
duty of the local board to forward the registrant's appeal to the relevant appeal board.
32 C.F.R. § 1626.13 (1967).
29. The registrant may attach a written statement to his file before the file is for-
warded to the appeal board. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.12. The appeal board may base its
decision only upon the information contained in the registrant's record (including
his written statement if any) and general information concerning economic, industrial,
and social conditions. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.24 (1967), as anended, Exec. Order No. 11360
para. (6) (a), 32 FED. REG. 9787 (1967).
30. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.31 (1967).
31. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.3 (1967).
32. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.61 (1967).
33. 32 C.F.R. § 1627.1 (1967). In addition, either the State Director of Selective
Service or the Director of Selective Service may appeal from any determination of
a local board at any time. 32 C.F.R. § 1626.1 (1967).
34. The 1967 Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 460 (1964), provides that the decisions of the
local boards are "final" except where an appeal is taken pursuant to the regulations
established by the President and that the decisions of the appeal boards are "final"
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the registrant's exercise of the right to freedom of speech and/or it is
clear that an appeal would be futile35 (or, perhaps, unless the order
to report for induction was issued in violation of the relevant regula-
tions30), the registrant cannot institute a suit to enjoin the local board
from issuing an order to report for induction. The only manner in
which a registrant may obtain judicial review of his classification prior
to induction into military service in the absence of these circumstances
is to exhaust his administrative remedies (including submission to the
physical examination given by the armed services to all prospective
inductees) and then refuse to comply with an order to submit to in-
duction.38 When the registrant is then called upon to defend a crim-
unless modified or changed by the President. The provisions of the Administrative
Procedure Act are not applicable to the functions of the selective service system. 1967
Act, 50 U.S.C.A. App. § 463 (b) (1964).
35. Wolff v. Selective Service Bd., 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967).
36. In Townsend v. Zimmerman, 237 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1956), the court reversed
an order of the district court denying an injunction to set aside an order of induc-
tior, issued while an appeal from a classification was pending. Without discussing the
cases which had held that review was available only by habeas corpus or as a defense
in a criminal proceeding, Mr. Justice (then Judge) Stewart held that the order of
induction was issued in violation of the regulations and that ". . . until his administra-
tive appeal is disposed of... [the plaintiff] is entitled 'to have his induction enjoined."
Id. at 378.
37. E.g., Watkins v. Rupert, 224 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1955) (suit for permanent and
interlocutory' injunctive relief from order classifying regiitrant IA and requiring him
to report for induction).
In one case, involving extremely unusual facts, habeas corpus was successfully uti-
lized as a remedy prior to induction. Ex parte Fabiani, 105 F.Supp. 139 (E. D. Pa.
1952).
38. In Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. U.S. 549 (see also, Estep v. United States, 327
U.S. 114 (1946)), the Supreme Court held that a registrant could not defend a prose-
cution for failure to report for induction or for work of national importance upon
the basis that he had been wrongfully classified prior to the time when he had ex-
hausted all the procedures of the selective service process and had been finally ac-
cepted by the armed services. It has been held that a registrant had failed to exhaust
the administrative process when, for example, he failed to appeal from the last clas-
sification given by his local board, Skinner v. United States, 215 F.2d 767- (9th Cir.
1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 981 (1955), and when he neglected to present to the
appeal board, his claim that the local board was guilty of misconduct in connection
with his classification, Davis v. United States, 203 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1953), cert.
'denied, 345 U.S. 996 (1953).
The Falbo case was decided at a time when the regulations provided for medical
examination after the issuance of the order to report for induction. The regulations
currently provide for medical examination prior to the issuance of the order to report
for induction. See 32 C.F.R. § 1628 (1967). Thus, it would appear that before the
registrant attempts to defend a criminal prosecution for failure to report for induction
'or for work of national importance upon the basis that he was wrongfully classified,
19681
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inal action for knowingly disobeying an order of the local board,39
he may allege as a defense that the order to report for induction was
unlawful due to the fact that the local board's classification was arbi-
trary and illegal because of procedural irregularities and/or because
there was no basis in fact for the board's classification of the registrant.40
the registrant must submit to a physical examination which occurs prior to the issuance
of an order to report for induction.
While it would appear that the issuance of an order to report for induction marks
the end of the administrative process, see Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 338 (1946),
as a practical matter, in the absence of a precise judicial determination of the matter,
see Daniels v. United States, 372 F.2d 407, 413 (9th Cir. 1967), it would appear pru-
dent for the registrant who wishes to challenge his classification (or the order to sub-
mit to induction) to report to the induction center but to refuse to take a step for-
ward when requested to do so. In this manner, the registrant will be assured that he
has exhausted the administrative process and, at the same time, will have avoided
becoming subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
If the registrant fails to take the step forward when requested to do so, he is con-
sidered to have refused induction and may not be tried by court-martial. See 50
U.S.C.A. APP. § 462(a) (1964).
A registrant who fails to take the step forward, nevertheless may be considered to
have submitted to "constructive" induction under certain circumstances. Gilliam v.
Reeves, 263 F.Supp. 378 (W. D. La. 1966). Compare United States v. Hall, 36
U.S.L.W. 2018 (U.S.C.M.A. June 16, 1967).
The fact that the registrant must exhaust his administrative remedies plus the fact
that an inductee may not necessarily be required to participate in hostilities would
appear to indicate that a registrant who refused induction could not defend a criminal
prosecution upon the basis that the hostilities were illegal (unless he could prove
that it was certain or virtually certain that if inducted he would be required to par-
ticipate in the hostilities).
39. The 1967 Act, 50 U.S.C.A. APP. § 462 (1964), provides that any person who
knowingly fails or neglects or refuses to perform any duty required of him under or
in the execution of the Act, upon conviction, shall be subject to a fine of not more
than $10,000 or five years imprisonment or both. Trial may be by civil court, or, if
the registrant has been inducted, by court-martial. Id.
The 1967 Amendments direct the Department of Justicd to proceed with prosecu-
tions under this section as expeditiously as possible (or advise the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate in writing of the reasons for its failure to do so) and directs
the courts to give precedence to the trial of cases arising under the Act (and indi-
cates that appeals from the decision of any district court or court of appeals shall
take precedence over all other cases pending before the court to which an appeal is
taken). 1967 Amendments para. 10, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1348 (1967).
40. In Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946), the Supreme Court held that a
registrant who had exhausted the administrative procedures of the selective service
system could defend a criminal prosecution for failure to comply with an order to
submit to induction upon at least three bases: (1) that the Selective Service Act had
been violated ("The authority of the local boards is circumscribed by ... the Act.
. .:' Id. at 120); (2) that the regulations had been violated ("The authority of the
local boards is circumscribed by ...the regulations...." Id.); (3) that the board
[Vol. 9:682
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* Civilia status is an essential condition for this method of attack
upon the board's classification. If the registrant has been inducted into
the armed forces, the only method by which an individual may obtain
a judicial determination of his contention that hi§ induction into the
armed forces was unlawful is by way of habeas corpus.41  While the
had exceeded its jurisdiction because there was no basis in fact for the classification
which the board gave to the registrant ("The question of jurisdiction is reached only
if there is no basis in fact for the classification which it gave to the registrant." Id.
at 122). As to the last basis, see Dickinson v. United States, 346 U.S. 389, 396 (1953),
where the Court apparently held that there must be some affirmative evidence to sup-
port the local board's determination ("But when the uncontroverted evidence support-
ing a registrants claim places him prima facie within the statutory exemption, dis-
missal of the claim solely on the basis of suspicion and speculation is both contrary
to the spirit of the Act and foreign to our concepts of justice. Id. at 397).
The 1967 Amendments para. 8(c), U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws 1347-8 (1967) pro-
vide:
No judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of any
registrant ... except as a defense to a criminal prosecution . . . after the
defendant has responded affirmatively or negatively to an order to report
for induction, or for civilian work.... Provided, that such review shall go
to the question of jurisdiction herein reserved to local boards, appeal
boards, and the President only when there is no basis in fact for the
classification assigned to such registrant.
Although this section appears to limit judicial review to cases presenting a claim
that there was no basis in fact for the registrants classification, it would appear that
an order which violated the Act or the regulations could not be enforced even if there
was some basis in fact for the classification.
41. Habeas corpus is available to secure release from military service. Billings v.
Truesdale, 321 U.S. 542 (1944).
Paragraph 8(c) of the 1967 Amendments, U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 1347-8 (1967),
provides that "no judicial review shall be made of the classification or processing of
any registrant ...expect as a defense to a criminal prosecution. . . " Although this
provision appears to deprive the courts of jurisdiction to review the basis of a classi-
fication by means of habeas corpus, it is doubtful whether the statute precludes any
review by means of habeas corpus. US. CONsr. art. I S 9 cl. 2 provides that the writ
of habeas corpus may be suspended only "in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion . . ." and,
at least in time of peace, it does not appear that Congress possesses the ability to
deprive the federal courts of the power to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Eisentrager
v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963-4 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds sub norn.,
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); McNally. v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 135 (1934);
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 295 (1904); Ex parte Yerger, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 95 (1868).
Assuming that habeas corpus remains available, it may nevertheless be a less than
adequatd remedy. Mr. Justice Murphy in his concurring opinion in Estep v. United
States, 327 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1946), stated:
It should be noted in passing, however, that [habeas corpus after induc-
tion] may be quite illusory in many instances. It requires one first to enter
the armed forces and drop every vestige of civil rights. Military orders
become the law of life and violations are met with summary court-martial
WILLIAM, AND MARY LAW REVIEW
federal judiciary will entertain a suit for habeas corpus, the scope of
review is again apparently limited to procedural irregularities 4 ' and to
whether there was any basis in fact for the inductee's classification by
the local board.43
If a member of the armed forces does not contend that his induction
was unlawful, he may attempt to attack an order directing him to par-
ticipate in certain hostilities which he believes to be illegal by at least
two methods.
Article 90 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that:
Any person subject to this chapter who-
(2) willfully disobeys a lawful command of his superior commis-
sioned officer; shall be punished . . .as a court martial may -di-
rect . .44 %
procedure. No more drastic condition precedent to judicial review has
ever been framed. Many persons with religious or conscientious scruples
are unable to meet such a condition. But even if a person is inducted and
a quest is made for a writ of habeas corpus, the outlook is often bleak.
The proceeding must be brought in the jurisdiction in which the person
is then detained by the military, which may be thousands of miles removed
from his home, his friends, his counsel, his local board and the witnesses
who can testify in his behalf. Should he overcome all these obstacles and
possess enough money to proceed further, he still faces the possibility of
being shifted by the military at a moment's notice into another jurisdiction,
thus making the proceedings moot. There is little assurance, moreover,
that the military will treat his efforts to obtain the writ with sympathetic
understanding. These practical difficulties may thus destroy whatever ef-
ficacy the remedy might otherwise have and cast considerable doubt on
the assumption that habeas corpus proceedings necessarily guarantee due
process of law to inductees.
42. See In re Shapiro, 35 U.S.L.W. 2701 (D.N.J. May 22, 1967) (decided prior to
the Military Selective Service Act of 1967). See also Eagles v. United States ex rel.
Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946).
43. In Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304 (1946), the Court appeared
to hold that the Estep (327 U.S. 114 (1946)) scope of review would control in habeas
corpus proceedings by registrants claiming to have been improperly inducted. "If it
cannot be said that there were procedural irregularities of such a nature as to render
the hearing unfair ... or that there was no evidence to support the order . . .the
inquiry is at an end." Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, supra at 312. "Nor
can we say that there was no evidence to support the final classification made by the
board of appeal." Id. at 316. See Kanas v. Yancy, 36 U.S.L.W. 2321 (2d Cir, Dec. 3,
1967).
44. 10 U.S.C. S 890 (1946) (emphasis added).
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A similar provision deals with violation of or failure to obey any law-
ful general order or regulation. 45
A member of the armed forces may thus attack the legality of an
order by a refusal to obey followed by a defense of illegality in a
court-martial resulting from the refusal.
A defense "to a court-martial for the refusal to obey an order based
upon the allegation that the order was unlawful is extremely difficult
to sustain. The military courts generally follow the rule stated in
Vinthro p's Military Law and Precedents:
[T]o justify an inferior in disobeying an order as illegal, the case
must be an extreme one and the illegality not doubtful. The order
must be clearly repugnant to some specific statute, to the law or
usage of the military service, or to the general law of the land.
The unlawfulness of the command must thus be a fact and in
view of the general presumption of law in favor of the authority
of military orders emanating from official superiors, the onus of
establishing this fact will, in all cases-except where the order is.
palpably illegal upon its face-devolve upon the defense, and clear
and convincing evidence will be required to rebut the presump-
tion. 6
More specifically, it would appear that where the allegation that the
order is unlawful is directed toward the legality under international
law of the hostilities in which the defendant is ordered to participate,
the presumption that the order is lawful appears to be conclusive.
If the defendant is convicted by a court-martial for failing to obey
an order which he contends is unlawful, may the decision of the
court-martial sustaining the legality of the order be appealed to the
civil courts? The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides that
the decisions of the Court of Military Review are "final and conclu-
sive." '8 Pursuant to this statute, the civilian courts have held that
upon petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the civilian courts will not
review the decision of military tribunals on the merits:
[I]n habeas corpus proceedings to obtain release from detention
pursuant to a sentence of a court-martial, there can be no dis-
45. 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1964).
46. W. nmRop's MILITARY LAW & PRE.EDENTS 575 (2d ed). See e.g., United States
v. Buttrick, 18 C.M.R. 622 (1954); United States v. Trani, 3 C.M.R. (1952).
47. United States v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 2198 (U.S. C.M.A., September 26, 1967).
48. 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
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charge if the military court (1) was duly constituted, (2) had
jurisdiction over the person of the alleged offender, (3) had
jurisdiction to try the offense, and (4) was authorized to pro-
nounce under the law.49
Another method whereby a member of the armed forces may at-
tack the legality of an order directing him to participate in what he
contends is an unlawful war is presented by the possibility of a suit
to enjoin his superior from issuing or enforcing the order. An indi-
vidual who institutes such a suit is faced initially with the possible
invocation of at least two doctrines which may prevent a decision
upon the merits.
The first doctrine which may be invoked is a decision by the court
that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain such a suit. In Chisholm v. Geor-
gia,50 Chief Justice Jay, by way of dictum, indicated that the judicial
power did not extend to suits against the United States unless Congress
by general or special enactment consented to the suit.5' From this dic-
tum has evolved the doctrine of the sovereign immunity of the United
States and a suit instituted by a member of the armed forces against
his superior may be dismissed as a suit against the Government without
its consent.52
As the Supreme Court has confessed with respect to the decisions
concerning suits against government agents acting in their official
capacity where the United States has not consented to be sued, "it is
fair to say that to reconcile completely all the decisions of the Court
in this field . . . would be a Procrustean task." 13 Although this state-
ment related to decisions prior to 1949, it is believed that it remains
true to a certain extent and no attempt will be made to reach a definite
answer to the question of whether this "doctrine" does in fact prevent
a suit by a member of the armed forces against his superior.
Assuming that the court does hold that it possesses jurisdiction, the
court may invoke the second doctrine, the doctrine of "political ques-
49. United States ex rel. Okenfus v. Schulz, 67 F.Supp. 529 (D.N.Y. 1946).
50. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
51. See generally WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 157-61 (1963).
52. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 S.Ct.
282 (1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1967).
53. Malone v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962).
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tions," to withhold a decision upon the merits.M This doctrine may
prove to be the far more important of the two.
The doctrine of "political questions" is ". . . primarily a function
of the separation of powers" " and has been defined as a doctrine
which asserts that "courts may neither reconsider nor review the de-
cision of a coordinate department of the Government made in the
exercise of its constitutional authority." 56 In Baker v. Carr5 7 Mr. Jus-
tice Brennan indicated the factors which are taken into account in a
decision that a particular issue presents a political question:
. .. textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the is-
sue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the im-
possibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of
a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of the government;
or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion.58
In the realm of foreign relations, the courts have applied the doctrine
of political questions to, and have thus refused to review, the decision
of the executive on such questions as whether or not a treaty has been
terminated,5 9 which nation possesses sovereignty over disputed terri-
tory,O and whether a particular foreign government is entitled to im-
munity from suit pursuant to the restrictive theory of sovereign im-
munity.61
Although the courts have not expressly held that judicial deference
54. See, e.g., Mora v. McNamara, - F.2d - (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 88 S.Ct. 282
(1967); Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1967).
55. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 187, 210 (1962).
56. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law: Political Questions, 104 U.PA.
L.REv. 451 (1956).
57. 369 U.S. 187 (1962).
58. Id. at 217.
59. Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902).
60. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 307 (1829).
61. See Cohen, Some Problems of Doing Business With State Trading Agencies,
1965 U.kL.L.FoRuM 520, 529.
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is constitutionally required in the field of foreign relations, the deci-
sion to refrain from review would appear to possess "constitutional
underpinnings." 62 One "great structural principle of American Consti-
tutional Law," according to Edward S. Corwin, "is supplied by the
doctrine of the Separation of Powers." 63 The American conception
of this doctrine has been summarized in several propositions:
(1) There are three intrinsically distinct functions of government,
the legislative, the executive, and the judicial; (2) these distinct
functions ought to be exercised respectively by three separately
manned departments of government; which, (3) should be consti-
tutionally equal and mutually independent.... 64
Conceptions of precisely which governmental functions are appro-
priately exercised by each of the three departments are, undoubtedly,
vague. Nevertheless, the courts are apparently of the opinion that
however much the three branches may share governmental power in
some areas, each department is possessed of certain powers which it
may exercise to the exclusion of the- others. Thus, the decision in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer 5 appears to rest, according
to one commentator, upon "the proposition that since Congress could
have ordered the seizure [of the steel industry in 1952], . . .the Presi-
dent, in making it on his own, usurped 'legislative power' and thereby
62. This term was utilized by the-Supreme Court in Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964) in connection with its discussion of the "act of
state doctrine." In the Sabbatino case, the Court held that the judiciary would refuse
to review the validity of the act of a foreign government under international law.
The refusal of the courts to review the validity of the act of a foreign government
is termed the "act of state doctrine." (With reference to this doctrine, the Court
stated that although the act of state doctrine is not required by the Constitution, the
doctrine
... does ... have "constitutional" underpinnings. It arises out of the
basic relationships between branches of government in a system of sep-
aration of powers. It concerns the competence of dissimilar institutions
to make and implement particular kinds of decisions in the area of inter-
national relations. The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses
the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task
of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state may hinder rather
than further this country's pursuit of goals both for itself and for the
community of nations as a whole in the international sphere. Id.
63. CORWIN, INTRODUCTION IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES oF AMERICA,
SENATE Doc. No. 39, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1964).
64. Id. at 9-10.
65. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
[Vol. 9:682
INTERNATIONAL ILLEGALITY
violated the principle of the Separation of Powers." GG The President's
action was therefore deemed unconstitutional. Similarly, it would
appear to follow that it would be unconstitutional for the courts to
"usurp" the powers which are possessed exclusively by one or both
of the other departments of government.
The extent of the constitutional authority possessed by the judiciary
in the field of foreign relations is uncertain to say the least. If the
"power" to conduct the external affairs of the nation is viewed as
possessed exclusively by one or both of the "political" departments of
the government, it would appear that it would be unconstitutional for
the courts to "usurp" the power of these branches of government.
Perhaps the least that may be noted is that it would be "inappropriate"
for the judiciary to interfere with the policy determinations which are
necessarily involved in the conduct of the nation's foreign affairs and
which are ".... of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion." 67
"Is the question of the legality of a decision to engage in hostilities a
question which is "appropriate" for resolution by a judicial institution?
. The factors which a President takes into account before seeking a
declaration of war from the Congress are certainly of a varied nature.
For example, he may consider the strength (in terms of resources and
possible allies) possessed by the potential target state, the strength in
the same terms of the United States, and the objectives which might
be accomplished or defeated by war with the potential target state.
After considering such factors as these, the President then makes a
judgment as to whether war with the potential target state is the de-
sirable course of action. A judgment of this nature is generally vieived
as a political judgment, the correctness of which is viewed as review-
able by the electorate to which the President and the Congress are
responsible.6 8
66. CoRwiN, supra note 63 at 11.
67. Baker v. Carr, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
68. See, e.g., Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F.2d 796, 799 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 933 (1964), wherein the .court noted that with respect to certain types of de-
cisions:
... [there] is no reason why we as judges should regard ourselves as some
kind of Guardian Elders ordained to review the political judgments of
the elected representatives of the people. In framing policies relating to
the great issues of national defense and security the people are and must
be, in a sense at the mercy of their elected representatives. . . . [Tihe
basic and important corollary is that the people may remove their elected
representatives as they cannot dismiss United States Judges.
See also Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960).
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Judicial review of the judgment of the President to the effect that
war is the proper course of action would be undesirable for at least
two reasons. First, the federal judiciary is not responsible to the elec-
torate and, it is believed, a decision as grave as the decision to go to
war should not be made by individuals who are not politically respon-
sible. Second, the nature of the judicial process as we now view it is
such that many factors which the President takes into account before
making his judgment would not or could not be taken into account
in the judicial process of decision-making.
However, it is submitted that there are certain questions presented
by a decision to engage in hostilities which could be appropriately de-
termined by the judiciary. One function of judicial review in the
American system of government is the function of "legitimatizing"
the exercise of authority. Governmental officials are entrusted with
certain powers upon assuming office. When a government official acts
in a particular matter, judicial review of his action ensures that the
official has been endowed, in fact, with the power to take the par-
ticular action. In addition, assuming that the official does in fact possess
the requisite power, judicial review serves to ensure the exercise of
the power in the prescribed manner (thereby, if the determination
is in the official's favor, "clothing" the act with authority).
While the judiciary should not and perhaps could not review the
wisdom of the President's judgment to engage in hostilities, the courts
could determine, it is submitted, whether the President possessed the
power to order the armed forces to engage in hostilities (and, if so,
perhaps to a limited extent, whether he exercised this power in the
proper manner).69 Thus, the courts could determine: Whether the
President possessed the legal capacity to command American forces
to engage in hostilities without a congressional declaration of war; if
not, whether the President had requested a declaration from Congress;
and if so, whether Congress had issued such a declaration. A deter-
mination of this type of question does not involve a review of the
wisdom of the President's decision to engage in hostilities.
Several examples may clarify the suggested distinction. In Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,70 President Truman, to avert a
69. See United States v. Schmidt Pritchard & Co., 47 C.C.P.A. 152, cert. denied,
364 U.S. 919 (1960), which invalidated action taken by the President because he did
not strictly adhere to the procedures established by Congress in the legislation dele-
gating the power to act to the President.
70. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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nationwide strike of steel workers which he believed would jeopardize
the national defense, issued an Executive Order7' directing the Secre-
tary of Commerce to seize and operate most of the steel mills of the
country. The Court affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction
restraining the Secretary apparently on the basis that neither the Presi-
dent's executive powers under Article II of the Constitution nor the
President's powers as Commander-in-Chief permitted the President to
order the seizure. The Court did not question, at least explicitly, the
President's determination that a strike of the steel workers would jeop-
ardize the national defense. Moreover, the Court did not appear to
question the President's determination that a seizure of the mills was
the best manner in which to avert a strike. Rather, the Court was
concerned solely with the power of the President to order the seizure
and apparently assumed that the seizure was a desirable measure to
safeguard the national defense.
Similarly, in Ex parte Milligan,72 the Court invalidated President Lin-
coln's order following his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus,
providing for the trial by military commission of persons held in cus-
tody as "spies" and "abettors of the enemy." 73 The Court again did
not apparently question the wisdom of the President's course of action
but considered only the power of the President to issue the order.
Bro'wn v. United States 4 provides a final example. The property of
certain British citizens had been loaded aboard a ship for transporta-
tion to England prior to the war of 1812. When war was declared,
the ship was not permitted to sail for its final destination. The cargo
was ultimately unloaded and stored on land for at least twelve months
when it was sold. A United States Attorney filed a libel against the
cargo as the property of enemy aliens. Chief Justice Marshall, speaking
for the Court, held that in absence of statute, the Executive did not
possess the power to seize the property of enemy aliens when the
property was located on land within the continental United States.
Again, the Court did not concern itself with the question of whether
71. Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139-43.
72. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866). See also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
73. Chief Justice Chase and three other Justices, although they agreed with the
Court in ordering the release of Milligan, were of the opinion that Congress, in time
of war, could authorize the substitution of military tribunals for civil tribunals for
the trial of certain offenses. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139-40 (1966)
(opinion of Chase, C.J.).
74. 12 US. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
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the seizure of alien property in these circumstances was a desirable
method of prosecuting the war. The Court was concerned solely
with the presence or absence of Executive power.
It is submitted that, despite frequent citation, the leading cases in
this area do not support the proposition that the judiciary is precluded
from determining whether the President possesses the power to order
the armed forces to engage in hostilities.
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,j"5 the Court was concerned
with the validity of a Joint Resolution of Congress which rendered the
sale of arms to certain warring countries unlawful "if the President
.... [found] that the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions
of war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed
conflict . .. may contribute to the re-establishment of peace . . . and
if ... he makes proclamation to that effect .... ,, 76 More specifically,
the question before the Court was whether the standards contained
in the Resolution were so vague that the Resolution was unconstitu-
tional as an unlawful delegation of legislative power. The Court in-
timated that if the Resolution -had purported to deal solely with do-
mestic affairs, the Resolution would have been unconstitutional. 77 How-
ever, the Court stated:
... we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the
President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the
field of international relations ... , Congressional legislation which
is to be made effective through negotiation and inquiry within
the international field must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which would
not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved. 78
Upon this basis, the Court sustained the validity of the Resolution.
Thus, the very issue before the Court in the Curtiss-Wright case was
whether the President possessed the power to act. As the Court sus-
tained the Resolution of Congress delegating power to the President,
the Court held the President did in fact possess the requisite power. It
is important to note that the Court was not faced with the question
75. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
76. 48 Stat. 811 (1934).
77. 299 U.S. at 315.
78. Id. at 319-20.
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presented, for example, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,79
and did not decide whether the President possessed the power to take
the action he did in the absence of a valid Congressional Resolution.
In Martin v. Mott,s° Congress had authorized the President to call
upon the militia "whenever the United States shall be invaded or be
in imminent danger of invasion .... " The plaintiff, a member of the
New York militia, failed to report for duty when the Governor of
New York, acting pursuant to the President's request, called out the
New York militia. The plaintiff was court-martialed, convicted and
fined. The plaintiff then sought to recover the amount paid as a fine.
In the course of its opinion, the Court stated that it would not review
the determination of the President that the United States had been
or was about to be invaded and that, therefore, it was necessary to call
upon the state militia.8' By refusing to review the President's estimate
of the circumstances and his decision that the circumstances were such
that he was authorized to act pursuant to the statute, it may be stated,
in a narrow sense, that the Court refused to review the question of
whether the President possessed the power to act; for, if the circum-
stances were not those specified in the relevant statute, the President
was not authorized to act. 2 However, in a broad sense, the question
of whether the President possessed the power to act was not in issue.
The Congress had enacted a statute authorizing the President to call
upon the militia. The Court was not required to and did not determine
whether the President would have possessed the power to act in the
absence of an authorizing statute. In fact, the Constitution specifically
empowers the Congress to "call forth the militia" to repel invasions8 3
Had Congress not enacted legislation delegating this power to the Presi-
dent, it is probable that an attempt by the President to call upon the
militia would have been void.
In Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman, 4 the Court
declined to review an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)
denying a certificate of convenience and necessity to Waterman for
a route involving overseas air transportation. The Civil Aeronautics
79. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
80. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
81. Id. at 28-32.
82. That is, the Court refused to review the determination that certain "jurisdictional
facts" were present. See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
83. U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 15.
84. 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
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Act provided that orders of the CAB involving applications for air
routes of this type were to be submitted to the President, and that the
orders were subject to the President's approval, disapproval, or modi-
fication. The Court stated that a court could review the order of the
CAB either prior to or subsequent to the submission of the order to
the President. If a court were to review the order prior to submission
to the President, the court's determination would either be binding
upon the President or the President would be free to disregard the
court's determination entirely. If the court's determination were bind-
ing upon the President, the review by the court would be inappro-
priate as the review would occur before the order had acquired finality
(the order was not final until approved by the 'President) and thus
before the order imposed an obligation, denied a right, or established
some legal relationship. 5 If the court's determination could be entirely
disregarded by the President, review by a court would be inappropriate
in that the court's determination would merely serve as an advisory
opinion.8s
If the review were to occur subsequent to the President's determina-
tion, the Court held that it could not in any event review the action
of the President in approving, disapproving, or modifying the order
of the Board for to do so would be to review
• . . decisions as to foreign policy . . . [which were] political and
not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by the Constitu-
tion to the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long
been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to
judicial intrusion or inquiry.8 7
It would appear fairly clear that the Court could have reviewed cer-
tain portions of the order of the Board prior to the President's action.8"
However, it would also appear that the Court did not wish to limit,
in any manner, the flexibility possessed by the President. Congress
85. Id. at 112-13.
86. ld. at 113.
87. Id. at 111.
88. Id. at 114 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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empowered the President to act upon his estimate of the manner in
which the order of the Board would affect the nation's foreign affairs.
The Court was apparently of the view that any limitation upon the
President's freedom to act would not accord with the very purpose for
which Congress empowered the President to act and, therefore, declined
to review the Board's order.
However, it should be noted that again, there was no question but
that the President possessed the power to modify, approve, or disap-
prove the order of the Board. This power had been delegated to the
President by Congress. The Court was not presented with the question
and did not decide whether the President would have possessed the
power to act with respect to the order of the Board in absence of
Congressional authorization.
Finally, in JohAnson v. Eisentrager,9 the issue before the Court was
whether the federal courts possessed jurisdiction to issue a writ of
habeas corpus in a case involving nonresident aliens captured, tried and
convicted by an American military tribunal for violations of the laws
of war prior to their capture. As the aliens had never been within the
territorial jurisdiction of an American court, the Court held that it did
not possess jurisdiction. The remainder of the opinion, as noted by
Mr. Justice Black in his dissenting opinion, in which the Court states
that there was no doubt but that the President possessed the power to
send American forces to China (where the aliens were captured) was
composed of dictaY0
INTERNAL APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Assuming that it would be appropriate for the judiciary to determine
the existence of the power to order the armed forces to engage in
hostilities, where, in fact, does that power reside and what limitations
are imposed upon the exercise of that power by the norms of interna-
tional law?
The President is designated Commander-in-Chief by the Constitu-
tion."' Pursuant to the powers of the Commander-in-Chief, various
Presidents of the United States have ordered the armed forces to engage
in hostilities on occasion without formal congressional action.92 In
89. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
90. Id. at 791, 792 (Black, J., dissenting).
91. U.S. CoNsT. art. II, 5 2, cl. 2.
92. See CORWIw, supra note 63 at 541-2.
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most instances, the military operations appear to have been defensive in
character although there have been some occasions when the military
forces were utilized in offensive operations, more often than not, of a
limited character.
The constitution also empowers the Congress to declare war.9 3 The
question of when the President may take certain action without a con-
gressional declaration of war is not easily answered. But it does appear
that the least that was intended by the Framers is that a congressional
declaration was required in some circumstances. In The Prize Cases, 4
the Court sustained the validity of President Lincoln's implementation
of the blockade of the South at a time when Congress was not in ses-
sion. In the course of its opinion, the Court stated, "this greatest of
civil wars was not gradually developed . . . it sprunk forth suddenly
from the parent brain, a Minerva in the full panoply of 'war. The
President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, without
waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name given to
it by him or them could change the fact." 95 Perhaps the least that
could be said is that when immediate action is required and/or oppor-
tunity for congressional action is limited,"6 the President may act pur-
suant to his powers as Commander-in-Chief without a declaration of
war. However, when the necessity for action arises gradually, giving
time for deliberation, and/or where the President's action is to take the
form of a massive deployment of force, it would appear that a declara-
tion of war would be required.
Assuming that in some, if not all, circumstances, the President is free
to act without the necessity of resorting to Congress for a declaration
93. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, el. 11.
94. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
95. Id. at 668-9.
96. See The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700 (1872). In this case, it became neces-
sary to determine the exact dates upon which the Civil War began and ended (in
order to determine whether the statute of limitations had run). The Chief Justice,
speaking for a unanimous Court stated:
[Ilt is necessary . . . to refer to some public act of the political depart-
ments of the government to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons, those
of the executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was, at the com-
mencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess of Congress
must be taken. The proclamation of intended blockade by the President
may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the
proclamation that the war had closed, as marking the second. Id. at 702
(emphasis supplied).
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of war, is the President's power in these circumstances limited by a
norm of customary international law?
An indication of an answer to this question is to be found in Browz
v. United StatesY7 In that case, a libel was filed by a United States
Attorney against property alleged to belong to enemy aliens. No statute
specifically authorized the seizure of the property of enemy aliens lo-
cated on land9" within the continental United States. The United States
contended that the congressional declaration of war empowered the
executive, in executing the laws of war, to seize, and the courts to con-
demn, all property which, according to international law, was subject
to condemnation.
The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall, rejected the
position of the United States:
S.. [the] argument [of the United States] must assume for its
basis the position, that . . . [customary international law] consti-
tutes a rule which acts directly upon the thing itself, by its own
force, and not through the sovereign power. This position is not
allowed .... [The rule of customary international law] is a guide
which the sovereign follows or abandons at his vill; the rule, like
other precepts of morality, of humanity, and even of wisdom, is
addressed to the judgment of the sovereign; and although it cannot
be disregarded by him, without obloquy, yet it may be disre-
garded.99
97. 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
98. The fact that the property was located on land was utilized to show that the
attorney for the United States was not acting under the authority of letters of marque
and reprisal. Id. at 127.
99. Id. Mr. Justice Story dissented, id. at 128, upon the basis that the power of
the Executive to conduct the war included the power to libel property of the type
involved in the case. He referred to the law of nations not as a grant of power to
the Executive but as limitation upon the Executive's exercise of the power, i.e., the
Executive could libel only that property which, according to the law of nations, could
be confiscated. If the Executive wished to confiscate property which was not liable
to confiscation according to the law of nations, the Executive could not do so without
express congressional authorization. For example, see his dissenting opinion id. at
152-53:
My argument proceeds upon the ground, that when the legislative authority,
to whom the right to declare war is confided, has declared war in its most
unlimited manner, the executive authority, to whom the execution of the
war is confided, is bound to carry it into effect. He has a discretion vested
in him, as to the manner and extent; but he cannot lawfully transcend
the rules of warfare established among civilized nations.
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The Brom case thus appears to hold that at least in some areas,
customary international law does not empower the President to take
action unless the action is authorized in the manner prescribed by the
Constitution. Although the analogy is far from complete, it would
appear that in at least some areas customary international law which
has not been given effect as domestic law would not prevent the Presi-
dent from taking action which the Constitution permitted.100
Whether or not the conclusion reached in the preceding paragraph
is correct, it remains to consider whether the powers of the President
may be limited or "enlarged" by a treaty to which the United States
is a party.
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution of the United States empowers
the President to make treaties "by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate . . . providing two-thirds of the Senators present concur."
Treaties concluded in this manner become the supreme law of the
land.'' If, in this manner, the United States becomes a part to a treaty
which prohibits the employment of armed forces in certain circum-
stances, does the treaty, as "the supreme law" of the land, limit the
power of the President to order the employment of American armed
forces in hostilities prohibited by the treaty?
For purposes of domestic law, treaties have been classified into two
types: "self-executing" and "non-self-executing." 10 If a treaty is sus-
100. From the national point of view, this position would appear to be the most
desirable position for the courts to adopt. In the absence of an international "legis-
lature" to provide for radical changes in customary international law when changed
circumstances require, it would seem undesirable, from a national point of view, to
prevent the President from taking certain action in certain circumstances due to the
fact that a norm of customary international law, developed in other circumstances
and now, perhaps, in a slow process of evolution, prohibited the action. Thus, as-
summing that the norms of customary international law were definite enough to be
applied by a court of the United States, it seems probable that a court would not hold
that the President was prohibited from taking action which the Constitution permitted
as long as the norms of customary international law can be changed only by a process
of lengthy and slow evolution.
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
102. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829):
. . . [A Treaty] is . . . to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent
to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid
of any legislative provision [that is, when it is "self-executing"]. But when
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ceptible of direct application by the courts, i.e., if the treaty is self-
executing, the norm contained in the treaty will become effective as
internal law upon its adoption by the prescribed procedures. How-
ever, if the norm contained in the treaty is not susceptible of direct
application by the courts, i.e., if the treaty is not self-executing, the
norm contained in the treaty will not become effective as internal law
unless... and until Congress enacts legislation which implements the
treaty norm.
A non-self-executing treaty, by definition, is a treaty which is not
susceptible of immediate domestic application without further action.
Presumably, therefore, a non-self-executing treaty which purported to
limit the power of the nation to engage in certain forms of coercion
would require further implementation before it could be applied by
the courts as a limitation upon the nation's ability to engage in the
forms of coercion which the treaty was designed to prohibit.
The effect of a self-executing treaty is dependent upon the answer
to the question of whether the President is required to seek a declara-
tion of war under some circumstances or whether he need not seek
congressional action in any circumstances.
Assuming That the President Aust Request a Declaration of War in
Some Circumstances.
If the President is required to seek a declaration of war in some
the terms of the stipulation import a contract-when either of the parties
engages to perform a particular act [that is, when it is not "self-execut-
ing"), the treaty addresses itself to the political and not the judicial depart-
ment; and the legislature must execute the contract, before it can become
a rule for the Court.
See also Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). See generally McDOUGAL,
supra note 14 at 215-22.
103. The intention of the Framers as to whether Congress would be required to
implement a non-self-executing treaty is not clear. Certain provisions of the Jay
Treaty required appropriations to fulfill the obligations imposed by the provisions.
There apparently was no question but that Congress was the only body competent
to make the appropriations despite the existence of a treaty. See U.S. CoNsr. art. I,
§ 9. Certain members of the House of Representatives, notably Alexander Hamilton,
contended that, as the treaty was the "supreme law of the land," Congress was bound
to implement the treaty by making the appropriations. Madison, in opposition, intro-
duced a number of resolutions which provided, in essence, that Congress could de-
liberate the matter and decide whether or not to make the appropriations. The House
adopted Madison's resolutions and made the appropriations. See CoRwIN, supra note
63 at 468-9.
However, it would appear that Madison's view has prevailed. Id. at 470.
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circumstances, the existence of a self-executing treaty (or federal
legislation) limiting the President's power in those identical circum-
stances would be immaterial. The President would be required to seek
a declaration of war in either case (because the Constitution required
it or in order to supersede the self-executing treaty or to repeal the
prior legislation).
With respect to those circumstances in which, according to the Con-
stitution, the President may act pursuant to his own authority without
seeking a declaration of war, further difficulties are encountered.
(1) If, as the courts have traditionally held, a self-executing treaty
is no different than ordinary federal legislation, then a self-executing
treaty could not limit the authority possessed by the President by virtue
of his office without a violation of the principle of the Separation of
Powers. Therefore, the President would be required to seek a declara-
tion of war only in those circumstances in which the Constitution re-
quired congressional action. A treaty (or federal legislation) could not
require congressional action in those circumstances in which the Con-
stitution permitted the President to act upon his own authority.
In these circumstances, it would be a contradiction in terms to speak
of a "self-executing" treaty which limited the circumstances under
which the President was authorized by the constitution to act upon
his own authority.
Would it be possible to conceive of a self-executing treaty (or fed-
eral legislation) which "increased" the President's powers? Assuming
that the President could not take action under some circumstances
without congressional authorization, presumably, it would be possible
for Congress, by legislation, to authorize the President to take action
in this sphere in advance those of specific circumstances.' 04 Could this ad-
104. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), the Court upheld
the Joint Resolution of Congress which made it unlawful to sell arms to certain coun-
tries "if the President finds that the prohibition of the sale of arms and munitions of
war in the United States to those countries now engaged in armed conflict in the
Chaco may contribute to the reestablishment of peace . . . , and if . . . , he makes
proclamation to that effect. . . ." The Court indicated that the standards contained
in the statute were so vague that if the statute had purported to deal solely with
domestic affairs, the statute would have been unconstitutional as an unlawful delega-
tion of legislative power. However, as the statute concerned external affairs, the Court
stated that:
Congressional legislation . . . within the international field must often ac-
cord to the President a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory
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vance authorization take the form of a self-executing treaty? In order
to so hold, it would be necessary to hold that the President and two-
thirds of the Senators present on a particular day could authorize the
President in advance of particular circumstances to take action which
he could be authorized to take, in absence of a treaty, only with the
consent of the majority of both houses of Congress. 0 5 If a court were
to so hold, it would not be possible to speak of a self-executing
treaty which limited the President's authority but it would be possible
to speak of a self-executing treaty which "expanded" the President's
authority. If a court would not so hold, it would not be possible to
speak of a self-executing treaty in this area.
(2) It would be possible to view the President's powers under the
Constitution as composed of three different types: (a) powers which
he could exercise without congressional authorization; and, (b) powers
which could not be exercised without congressional authorization
restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.
Id. at 126.
105. Of course, it is not possible to predict with any degree of certainty the man-
ner in which a court would decide this question. However, it is possible to note
that in some areas, it has never been assumed that the treaty-making power could be
utilized to negate the constitutional grant of power to another house of congress.
Thus, the Constitution provides that "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequent of Appropriations made by law.... ." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 9. The
proposition that a treaty which required the appropriation of funds could not dispense
with the necessity for a congressional appropriation was apparently never questioned
by the men who had framed the Constitution. See CORwIN, supra note 63 at 469. It
would appear, therefore, that a treaty which requires an appropriation of funds can-
not be self-executing.
The power to declare war is specifically vested by the Constitution in the Congress
and not in the President and the Senate acting severally or jointly. Query, can a treaty
which provides for taking action in circumstances which would ordinarily require
congressional action ever be said to be self-executing, or, if self-executing, could
such a treaty be constitutional? See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 17 (1957):
The prohibitions of the Constitution were designed to apply to all branches
of the National Government and they cannot be nullified by the Executive
or by the Executive and the Senate combined.
See also Geoffroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), where the Court stated:
[TJhe treaty power as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from the
nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not
be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government....
(Emphasis supplied).
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(which may or may not take the form of a self-executing treaty or
federal legislation); and (c) powers which were "defeasible", i.e., which
he could exercise on his own authority unless Congress moved to limit
these powers by means of a self-executing treaty 06 (or by federal
legislation).
If the President were viewed as possessing these three types of
powers, it would be possible to speak of a self-executing treaty (or
federal legislation) which limited the President's authority. It would or
would not be possible to speak of a self-executing treaty which
"expanded" the President's authority depending upon whether or not
a court would hold that, in those areas in which a congressional authori-
zation was required before the President could act, Congress could
authorize the President to act in advance and that the advance author-
ization could take the form of a self-executing treaty.
Assuming That the President Need Not Request a Declaration of
War Under Any or Most Circumstances.
If it is true that the President need not, under any or most 1 7 cir-
cumstances, seek a declaration of war, then:
106. This type of power is conceived as similar to the power possessed by the
states to legislate in certain areas unless and until the Congress enacts legislation which
purports to encompass the identical subject matter. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of
Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851):
...the mere grant of ... [certain powers] to Congress ... [does] not
imply a prohibition on the States to exercise the same power[s]; that
it is not the mere existence of such ...[powers], but ...[the] exercise
[of the same powers] by Congress, which may be incompatible with the
exercise of the same power[s] by the States, and that the States may
legislate in the absence of congressional regulations.
See also the opinion of Hamilton writing under the pseudonym "Pacificus" in THE
FEDERA sT, No. I at 76, 82-3 (J. C. Hamilton ed. 1851) (Hamilton):
... the executive [possesses the right] in certain cases to determine the
condition of the nation, though it may, in its consequences, affect the
exercise of the power of the legislature to declare war. Nevertheless, the
executive cannot thereby control the exercise of that power. The legisla-
ture is still free to perform its duties, according to its own sense of them;
though the executive, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, may
establish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh in the legis-
lative decision. The decision of the executive power in the Constitution,
creates a concurrent authority in the cases to which it relates.
107. See Hearings on S. Res. No. 151, 90th Cong., 1st Seas. 80-1 (1967) wherein
Undersecretary of State Katzenbach stated that to use the phrase "to declare war"
would be to use "an outmoded phaseology." Mr. Katzenbach did not believe that
the Tonkin Gulf Resolution, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), was "constitutionally necessary" to
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(1) It is not possible to speak of a self-executing treaty in this
area. The President would require no authorization, advance or other-
wise, under any circumstances, to exercise authority in these areas.
Moreover, no treaty (or federal legislation) could limit the President's
power without violating the principle of the Separation of Powers.
Under this view, for purposes of the authority to employ the nation's
armed forces in hostilities, the President would be limited by neither
the Constitution108 nor a self-executing treaty (or federal legisla-
tion). The only effect of a treaty under this view would be to impose
an international obligation upon the country.
(2) It would be possible to modify the position somewhat so as to
view the President as possessing at least two types of power: (a)
powers which he could exercise on his own authority and which could
not be limited by Congress without a violation of the principle of the
Separation of Powers; and, (b) defeasible powers which he could ex-
ercise on his own authority unless Congress moved to limit his author-
ity by means of a self-executing treaty or otherwise.
In this situation, it would be possible to speak of a self-executing
treaty (or federal legislation) which limited the President's authority
but it would not be possible to speak of a self-executing treaty (or
federal legislation) which "expanded" the President's authority.
(3) It would be possible to modify the position so as to hold that
all powers possessed by the President to employ the armed forces in
hostilities were "defeasible," i.e., could be exercised by the President
on his own authority unless Congress moved to limit the exercise of
the powers by self-executing treaty or otherwise.
The fact that so many variables are involved makes a prediction as
authorize the engagement of American forces in Vietnam. It is possible that Mr.
Katzenbach was of the opinion that the SEATO Treaty, (1955) U.S.T. 81, TI.A.S.
No. 3170, was sufficient, under the Constitution, to authorize the President's actions.
If, however, he was of the opinion that the President's action would have been author-
ized in absence of treaty and in absence of a declaration of war or congressional res-
olution, it is difficult, in view of the massive American committment in Vietnam, to
conceive of any circumstances in which according to Mr. Katzenbach, any type of
congressional action would be required.
108. Of course, in a broad sense, the President would be limited by the Constitution.
The Congress could refuse to raise an army, U.S. CoNSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 11, or to ap-
propriate funds for the maintenance of the armed forces, id. In addition, if the Presi-
dent persisted despite the lack of appropriations for maintenance of the armed forces,
he could be impeached by the House, U.S. CONSr. art. I, 5 2, para. 5, tried by the
Senate, U.S. CoNsr. art. I § 3, para. 6, and, upon conviction, removed from office,
U.S. CoxsT. art. I, § 3, para. 7.
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to which position a court would adopt extremely difficult. However,
it may be noted that a national court would attempt to take account
of, in addition to considerations of the "national interest", such factors
as the intention of the Framers, the traditional notion of the status of
self-executing treaties, the principle of the Separation of Powers, and
the American conception of limited government.
From the point of view of an American citizen, perhaps the most
desirable position, in view of the factors noted in the preceding para-
graph, would be a position which held that the President's power to
command the armed forces to engage in hostilities could be exercised
by the President upon his own authority unless Congress moved to
limit his authority by means of a self-executing treaty or by legislation.
This position possesses, from the national point of view, a number of
advantages. First, this position is extremely flexible. As the President and
not the Congress negotiates treaties, the only treaties which would
limit the President's powers would be those treaties which he submitted
to the Senate for its advice and consent. In addition, these treaties could
be superseded by subsequent inconsistent legislation enacted by ma-
jority vote of each house. Moreover, although the President's power
could be limited under this position without the President's participa-
tion (via federal legislation), Congress could always eliminate the lim-
itation by subsequent inconsistent legislation. Second, this position
would not, in all probability, involve the courts to a great extent. In
the absence of a limiting statute or treaty, the courts could rather easily
dispose of a suit attacking the President's exercise of authority. Third,
although this position would eliminate the concept of a self-executing
treaty (or of federal legislation) which "expanded" the President's
authority in this area, in light of the position's advantages as little
violence as seems possible is done to the factors noted in the preceding
paragraph.
The most desirable position from the standpoint of limitation upon
the power of the President to employ the armed forces in hostilities
would be a position which held that the President could act upon his
own authority only in a very limited number of circumstances. In all
other situations, he would be required to seek congressional action
(which could not be taken in advance). At least this position would
force a critical examination by Congress of the decision to engage in
hostilities. However, this result may be viewed from the national point
of view as a severe limitation upon flexibility which would be too great
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to tolerate. In addition, the courts might be constantly presented with
the need to define those circumstances under which the President could
take action upon his own authority without congressional authorization.
The possible increased involvement of the courts with the attendant
delay and uncertainty generated by the necessity of a case-by-case
delimitation of the President's authority might, from the national point
of view, be considered intolerable.
Perhaps the most that could be expected by an individual interested
in subjecting national decision to engage in hostilities to maximum judi-
cial review would be the adoption of a position to the effect that: (1)
while the President cannot act in certain circumstances without con-
gressional authorization, he may be authorized in advance (by self-
executing treaty or federal legislation) to take action in these circum-
stances; and, (2) the powers which the President may exercise on his
own authority include, in addition to the powers he possesses by virtue
of his office, certain powers which he may exercise upon his own
authority unless the Congress moves to limit the exercise of these
powers by means of a self-executing treaty or otherwise. From the
international point of view the only advantages that this position pos-
sesses over the position most desirable from the national point of view
is the increased involvement of the national courts and, possibly, the
Congress. An exercise of apparent presidential authority could be sub-
jected to attack as an action which the President is authorized to take
only with the participation of Congress and for which the President
had not received advance congressional authorization or, where the
President possessed a defeasible power, which had been prohibited by
federal legislation or self-executing treaty. However, in view of the
fact that the remaining positions involve either increased involvement
of the courts, a possible disadvantage from the national point of view,
or greater damage to the factors noted previously, the adoption of this
position is perhaps the most that the international community can
expect.
Assuming that a treaty may, under some circumstances, limit the
power of the President to employ the forces of the United States in
certain forms of coercion, does the Congress retain the power to ter-
minate the treaty, and if so, how may this power be exercised?
Legislation which implements a non-self-executing treaty possesses
the same status as other federal legislation and may be repealed, there-
fore, by subsequent inconsistent legislation (or subsequent inconsistent
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self-executing treaty). 1°9 Presumably, a congressional declaration of
war may be considered inconsistent with prior legislation implementing
a non-self-executing treaty prohibiting the resort to the use of force in
specified circumstances.
A norm contained in a self-executing treaty possesses no "higher"
status than that possessed by other federal legislation. Thus, the norm
may be repealed by subsequent inconsistent legislation (or a subsequent
inconsistent self-executing treaty or subsequent inconsistent federal leg-
islation implementing a non-self-executing treaty)."1O Presumably, a
congressional declaration of war could be viewed as inconsistent with a
self-executing treaty prohibiting the resort to the use of force in certain
circumstances and for certain purposes.
Similarly, the Constitution provides that the laws of the United
States made in pursuance of the Constitution become the supreme law
of the land."' It would appear, therefore, that even if a norm of cus-
tomary international law could limit the President's power to employ
the armed forces of the United States in certain forms of coercion, a
court would be bound by the Constitution to apply inconsistent federal
legislation.
Thus, it would appear that assuming it was possible to limit the
President's authority to employ the armed forces of the United States
in certain forms of coercion by self-executing treaty, legislation im-
plementing a non-self-executing treaty, or norm of customary inter-
national law, it would appear that this limitation could be removed
by subsequent inconsistent federal legislation.
109. This conclusion would appear to follow from the fact that Congress is ap-
parently not required to implement a non-self-executing treaty, supra note 103.
110. E.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888):
By the Constitution a Treaty is placed on the same footing, and made of
like obligation, with an Act of legislation. Both are declared by that in-
strument to be the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is
given to either over the other. When the two relate to the same subject,
the courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to
both, if that can be done without violating the language of either; but if
the two are inconsistent, the one last in date will control the other,
provided always the stipulation of the Treaty on the subject is self-exe-
cuting. If the country with which the Treaty is made is dissatisfied with
the action of the legislative department, it may present its complaint to
the executive head of the government, and take such other measures as it
may deem essential for the protection of its interests. The courts can afford
no redress.
See also Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784 (No. 13, 799) (C. C. D. Mass. 1855).
111. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, para. 2.
[Vol. 9:682
INTERNATIONAL ILLEGALITY
CONCLUSION
Peaceful relations between nations, at all times and in all circum-
stances, is one of mankind's greatest dreams. The League of Nations,
the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the United Nations are representative of
efforts which have pushed the world further along the spectrum from
anarchy to the desired goal. However, it appears likely that as long as
future efforts are directed solely to international prescriptions designed
to directly affect only nations and not individuals, further progress will
be slow and, perhaps, minimal.
The international community has apparently developed a norm which
prohibits the utilization of military force by nations in some circum-
stances. However, the nations of the world have been unable or un-
willing to reach agreement upon the establishment of a truly effective
centralized institution to apply this norm. This paper has explored one
small aspect of a possible remedy for this defect.
If individual citizens could attack, in domestic judicial institutions,
the decision of government officials to engage in hostilities upon the
basis that the hostilities are prohibited by international norms, it is
possible that the range of policy-decisions available to national officials
would be effectively narrowed. Of course, this suggestion is not an
ideal solution. Domestic judges are citizens who may be affected by
the mood of the country and who may be moved by conceptions of
patriotism or of the "national interest." In addition, citizens may be-
come convinced that the nation should engage in hostilities despite the
fact that the hostilities violate international law and may participate in
the nation's effort regardless of the existence of legal right to decline
to do so. Nevertheless, it does appear that an immediate rejection of
the proposal would be unwarranted.
Further investigation may ultimately prove that the proposal is un-
workable. This paper has presented a preliminary analysis of the cur-
rent legal problems encountered by an American citizen who attempts
to resist compulsory participation in hostilities upon the basis that the
hostilities are prohibited by international law. This analysis indicates
that the citizen faces virtually insurmountable obstacles in such areas
as procedure, jurisdiction, judicial self-restaint and constitutional law.
American courts under current legal doctrine appear, therefore, to
possess only limited utility as institutions for the application of inter-
national prescriptions in this area. Additional study and reflection may
suggest a different conclusion. Hopefully, those who pursue peace will
not permit the discussion to rest here.
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